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Abstract. Globalisation has stimulated an intense competition among 
countries, in which the issue of nation brand is a central consideration. 
Since the mid-2000s, Russia has joined a list of countries that seek to use 
nation branding to fulfil politically determined and directed national 
ambitions. In taking stock of the current debate on this issue, the author 
addresses how Russia uses nation branding, what ends this is intended to 
serve, and what tangible resources are exploited to brand the country. In 
this context soft power is also considered. In conclusion it is stressed that 
Russia`s nation branding requires a bottom-up approach to succeed, as 
ordinary citizens convey as much, if not more, about a country than 
hosted international events.  
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УДК 327 
 
НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ БРЕНДИНГ  
И РОССИЙСКАЯ ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА 
 
Аннотация. Глобализация способствует формированию более 
конкурентной международной среды. В этих условиях вопросы 
национального бренда государств становятся весьма значимыми. С 
середины 2000-х годов Россия, заимствуя опыт ряда других стран, 
стала использовать национальный брендинг для достижения 
политических целей. Автор дает очерк дискуссий по проблематике 
национального брендинга, затем рассматривает использование Россией 
национального брендинга и его цели, а также анализирует ресурсы, 
                                                 
 The first version of this article was published as UI Occasional Paper No. 21 (October 2013) 
on the website of the Swedish Institute of  International Affairs (www.ui.se).    
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задействованные для брендинга страны. В этом контексте 
рассматривается и российская политика «мягкой силы». В заключение 
подчеркивается, что для более успешного национального брендинга 
России важно сместить фокус, акцентируя инициативу на местах, 
поскольку обычные люди вносят не меньший (возможно, и больший) 
вклад в представление о стране, чем значимые международные 
события, проводимые на ее территории. 
 
Ключевые слова: национальный брендинг, Россия, внешняя 
политика, дипломатия, ресурсы, мягкая сила, народ. 
 
 
Introduction 
The process of globalisation has made the concept of nation brand an 
important one in the current context. This ensures that there is intense 
competition among countries for attention, respect, and trust in order to 
achieve their policy goals and objectives. One of the means to market a 
country within an international competition is the use of nation branding.1 
This concept has become popular, but some have argued whether a nation 
can be marketed like some kind of product.2 A combination of increasing 
competition between countries and advances in new communication 
technologies is ensuring a much more interactive communication between 
governments and foreign publics.3 
As pointed out by Ying Fan, nation brand and nation branding are two 
different things. A nation may already have a brand, regardless of whether 
branding is taking place (Fan 2006). This is formed by the nature of 
information generated about that nation, and the stereotypes and opinions 
held by various publics. Branding may take place to reform, repair, 
enhance, or remake the existing image in order for the country to be 
viewed as more attractive and competitive. Nation branding can be seen as 
a form of cure or panacea for something that is “wrong” with a country’s 
image (Ibid).  
However, nation branding is not something that is easily undertaken. 
It needs to take into account the sum of all of a country’s parts and align 
them into a simple and appealing message that resonates with the target 
audience. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has joined the list of countries that 
seek to use nation branding to fulfil politically determined and directed 
national ambitions (Simons 2011). How does Russia use nation branding, 
                                                 
1 Marsh and Fawcett 2011, 517; Fan 2008; Stock 2009; Szondi 2010. 
2 O’Shaughnessy and O’Shaughnessy 2000; Seib 2009a. 
3 Wang 2005; L’Etang 2009; Szondi 2010. 
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and for what purpose? What are the tangible resources that are exploited 
to brand the country? 
Before answering this question, stock needs to be taken of the current 
debate on nation branding. This is an increasingly common term and 
practice, but is not necessarily commonly understood. Thus, the 
foundations of the concept and practice of nation branding are discussed. 
Soft power forms the subject of the next section, which outlines 
definitional issues and the significance of soft power. This is then tied to 
the 2013 Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. The 
ambitions and goals of this document are connected with the practice of 
nation branding and the desire to accumulate soft power. Lastly, this 
article details different attempts at nation branding by the Russian 
Federation, and how these connect to understandings of soft power (and 
what purpose this serves).  
 
Nation Branding and International Reputation  
Globalisation has stimulated an intense competition among countries, 
in which the issue of nation brand is a central consideration. Two broad 
types of nation branding can take place:  promise branding and rebranding.  
Promise branding involves the projection of a future desired state of being, 
and rebranding is the attempt to shed a negative image (Tatevossian, 
2008, 189). Countries compete with one another for the “attention, respect 
and trust of investors, tourists, consumers, donors, immigrants, the 
media, and the governments of other nations: so a powerful and positive 
nation brand provides a crucial competitive advantage.”4 This list provides 
a limited number of possibilities that motivate a country to engage in 
nation branding. Wally Olins writes of three areas where nations are in 
direct and overt competition with one another: brand export, direct foreign 
investment, and tourism. He explains that the success of the endeavour 
relies upon the “clarity, emphasis and enthusiasm with which it projects 
its national brand” (Olins 2005, 172). Fan also describes how 
communication should be delivered in order to be effective: “In nation 
branding the aim is to create a clear, simple, differentiating idea built 
around emotional qualities which can be symbolised both verbally and 
visually and understood by diverse audiences in a variety of situations” 
(2006, 6). However, this does not explain this informational tool. This leads 
to the question of what exactly is nation branding?  
Simon Anholt defines nation brand as “the sum of people’s perceptions 
of a country across six areas of national competence.” These areas include 
tourism, exports, people, governance, culture, heritage, investment, and 
                                                 
4 Anholt, S. “What is a Nation Brand?” Superbrands. No date given. Accessed August 23, 
2013. http://www.superbrands.com/turkeysb/trcopy/files/Anholt_3939.pdf 
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immigration.5 Fan argues that “to work effectively, nation branding must 
embrace political, cultural, business, and sport activities” (2006, 6). This 
provides a slight difference of opinion from what Anholt contends. Two 
differences exist, which separate nation branding from more traditional 
forms of public diplomacy: First, there is a greater depth of realisation 
among countries about the value of their brand as an asset: 
“Understanding valuation helps countries better understand the 
investments they make in their image.” This helps to focus and make more 
efficient efforts to increase their brand value and attractiveness. Second, 
there is an increasing focus on the behavioural aspects of managing a 
nation’s image. This includes an increasing need for cooperation and 
collaboration among governments, non-profits, and business to align 
messages and the “fundamental common purpose” of respective countries 
(Teslik 2007). 
Whether or not a nation-branding campaign is a success boils down to 
the nature and quality of the product a country is trying to sell. 
Additionally, it may take some time before the fruits of a campaign become 
apparent. In some cases, policymakers have neither the patience nor the 
time politically. Belgium abandoned one such branding campaign after 
failing to achieve rapid progress. Success is also linked to the need for high 
level collaboration between and among senior figures in the government, 
civil society, and the business sector. Partnership, collaboration, and 
communication must be effective and efficient between different 
governmental, civil, and commercial units to project the common sense of 
purpose and a unified (non-contradictory) message.6  
The results of nation branding campaigns are very difficult to measure 
accurately.  Currently there are two high profile attempts to quantify the 
progress: the country brand index from the FutureBrand consulting firm 
and the Anholt GfK Roper nation brand index.7 When competing and/or 
contradictory messages are communicated into the public communication 
space, the effectiveness of nation-branding campaigns is severely 
weakened.  
It is essential that a country understand how it is viewed and 
perceived by publics around the world. National image and national 
identity are intertwined and linked in some regards. How a nation sees 
itself cannot be entirely divorced from the perceptions of others about the 
nation concerned and how those people view others (Stock 2009, 120). 
This includes “how their achievements and failures, their assets and their 
liabilities, their people and their products are reflected in their brand 
                                                 
5 Anholt, S. “What is a Nation Brand?” Superbrands. No date given. Accessed August 23, 
2013. http://www.superbrands.com/turkeysb/trcopy/files/Anholt_3939.pdf 
6 Teslik 2007; Fan 2006; Aitken and Campelo 2011. 
7 Fetscherin 2010; Anholt 2005. 
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image.”8 Nation branding cannot be used to promote poor policy or to 
substitute or mask bad policy. Such efforts will eventually become 
apparent and this ultimately impacts upon the intangible assets of the 
country concerned. Informational technologies permit the utilisation of 
“signs, meanings, symbols, signification” that allow for the projection of 
different forms of capital (civic, political, economic, etc.) that potentially 
inscribe a nation with meaning (Odih 2010, xi).  
Nation branding campaigns often employ a readily identifiable symbol 
(logo) that identifies the nation being branded and the partners involved in 
doing the branding. This is a visual tool to identify the nation concerned 
and project endorsement from the partner organisations. The symbol itself 
is not the real value, but those properties and values that are perceived as 
being behind it. One successful example of a nation branding symbol is 
Joan Miro’s sun for Spain (Olins 2005, 178). There are numerous 
considerations that need to be understood, planned, and implemented. 
What is the core idea of the branding? What makes the country distinct 
from others? Does the branding projected match the actual situation (or in 
some cases perception)? Issues of coordination, management, audience 
segmentation, and identification of key audience also need to be 
determined.  
Simon Anholt defines brand strategy as being “a plan for defining the 
most realistic, most competitive and most compelling strategic vision for 
the country, region or city; this vision then has to be fulfilled and 
communicated.”9 Therefore the brand essence is gained by countries and 
people who actually live the brand that is being projected. Any perceived or 
actual contradictions can destroy an existing brand or ensure that 
attempts at projecting a new one will fail.  
Acts of communication need to support and reinforce the brand being 
projected. Some common daily factors to consider in engaging in this 
include: 1) export brands of the country concerned; 2) the way in which a 
nation promotes itself for trade, tourism, domestic investment, and 
domestic recruitment; 3) a nation’s conduct in domestic and foreign policy, 
and how this is communicated; 4) how a nation promotes, represents, and 
shares its culture; 5) the way in which a nation’s citizens behave abroad 
and how they treat strangers at home; 6) how the human-built and natural 
environments are presented to visitors; 7); the nature of world media 
coverage of a country; 7) the various bodies and organisations of which the  
country is a member: 8) the other countries with which it associates; 9) the 
nature of competition with other countries in sport and entertainment; and 
10) what a country gives and takes from the world (Anholt 2003, 214–216).  
                                                 
8 Anholt, S. “What is a Nation Brand?” Superbrands. No date given. Accessed August 23, 
2013. http://www.superbrands.com/turkeysb/trcopy/files/Anholt_3939.pdf 
9 Anholt 2003, 214; Volcic and Andrejevic 2011. 
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This list demonstrates the enormous task of trying to balance between 
projected brand image and the image communicated by individuals and 
organisations going about their daily business. What is observable above is 
that a nation’s brand can be further divided into sub-brands. These are 
political brand, economic brand, and cultural brand (Fan 2008, 155). Any 
country of significant size and longevity of existence usually has an 
existing brand. This is the result of people having heard about them and 
possessing certain images, associations, and opinions. The result is that 
certain countries are not value free and may be weighed down with clichés, 
and unbalanced or dated images.10 The value for the brand is found in the 
set of associations and values that are invoked by the brand identity. 
These associations can be transferred to the product itself. Thus, the 
marker of brand identity serves as a means to induce sets of values and 
emotions in a target audience.11 In order for any kind of success to be 
likely, there needs to be a unitary sense of purpose, values, and control 
among state bodies.12 
Nation branding takes into consideration a number of different 
components, which should not be neglected or viewed in isolation. Felix 
Stock names and explains these parts:13 
 National identity: the basic problem of weak national identities 
producing weak national images. This is based upon key elements such as 
common language, laws, historic territory, memory, and myths. This is 
about creating an emotional bond between citizens of a country. There 
needs to be a clear understanding and idea about communicating and 
promoting this identity to the outside world. 
 Reference point: this provides a contextual framework from which 
to shape the image formation process. National identity becomes clear and 
meaningful through contrasts and comparisons with other nations. 
 Construed image: this aspect refers to how a nation’s population 
perceives their country and how others perceive it. This links back to 
issues concerning national identity, but also the nature of efforts that will 
be required to modify the image.  
 Actual image: the “real” image of a nation that is held by another 
nation. This includes a set of beliefs and associations about the nation 
concerned. 
 Current project image: these are the efforts by a nation to project 
and communicate a desired image to another nation.  
                                                 
10 Anholt 2003, 219; Chattalas, Kramer and Takada 2008, 58; Stock 2009, 121. 
11 Volcic and Andrejevic 2011, 603; Mihailovich 2006. 
12 Anholt 2003, 222; Mihailovich 2006, 246; Wang 2008, 19. 
13 Stock 2009, 122–23. 
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 Desired future image: a “visionary perception” forms the point of 
reference for communicating the desired image to the outside world.  
Some apparent contradictions do, however, take place. One would 
expect that if one country holds a negative opinion of another country, 
they are less likely to purchase their products. The relationship between 
China and Japan is a very strained one politically, yet Japanese products 
are popular in the Chinese market (Fan 2006, 9). Therefore, political 
tensions and/or negative national stereotypes do not necessarily affect the 
decision to purchase products from a country with a negative brand.  
One of the drawbacks of a number of different public diplomacy 
campaigns (in the broad sense and understanding of the practice, which 
includes nation branding) is that they can be viewed as a smokescreen to 
cover “ineffective or wrongheaded policy.” If there is disconnect between 
what is communicated through public diplomacy and what is practiced in 
policy, public diplomacy will not succeed. The two should work in tandem 
(Seib 2009b).  
 
Soft Power 
The nature of power is also in the process of changing. According to 
Nye, power is capable of two things: an ability to get a desired outcome and 
to influence the behaviour of others in order to achieve that desired 
outcome (2004, 1–2). There are two alternative ways of wielding power:  
fear and coercion or attraction and coopting. One needs to bear in mind 
that “power always depends on the context in which the relationship 
exists.” If objectives seem to be legitimate and just, others may willingly 
assist without the use of coercion or inducements (Ibid, 2).  
In order to proceed, there needs to be an understanding of power. 
Power’s definition is related to vested interests and values. Some argue 
that it is related to the ability to make or resist change (Nye 2011, 5). A 
dictionary definition states that power is “the capacity to do things and in 
social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want” (Ibid., 6). 
Nye contends that power is a two-way relationship, which is defined by 
who is involved in the power relationship (scope of power) and what topics 
are involved (domain of power) (Ibid., 6–7). In the context of this paper, 
power and influence are to be viewed as related and interchangeable.  
Hard power’s basis is found in military and economic weight. This is in 
contrast to soft power, which “rests on the ability to shape the preferences 
of others” (Nye 2004, 5). Soft power is about establishing preferences 
normally associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, 
culture, political values, or institutions, and policies seen as legitimate or 
having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to 
follow, it will cost less to lead. In terms of a country, soft power can be 
found in its culture, political values, and foreign policy (Ibid., 6, 11). Fan 
has contended that nation branding can be an important component in 
developing and maintaining a nation’s soft power: “Successful nation 
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branding campaigns will help create a more favourable image among the 
international audience, thus further enhancing a country’s soft power” 
(Fan 2010, 100).  
Military or hard power assets are more controlled or owned by 
government than soft power assets (Nye 2004, 14). In this regard, there is 
a resemblance to the nature and practice of New Public Diplomacy. Nye 
also notes that “soft power is also likely to be more important when power 
is dispersed in another country than concentrated” (a dictator, for 
example) (2004, 16). Soft power is particularly relevant to the realisation of 
milieu goals (Ibid., 17). A drawback of soft power is that resources work 
more slowly, are more diffuse in nature, and more cumbersome to wield 
than hard power resources.”14 This means that they are harder to use, 
easy to lose, and the results take a longer time to become apparent.  
The system of “soft power resources work[s] indirectly by shaping the 
environment for policy, and sometimes take[s] years to produce the desired 
outcomes” (Nye 2004, 99). This leads to a point of criticism concerning soft 
power, which is that it has only a modest impact on policy outcomes  
(Ibid., 15). The basis of soft power is dependent upon the credibility of the 
communicator, which is where the use of political marketing and New 
Public Diplomacy come into their own. These communication technologies 
are designed to build the necessary relationships that contribute to 
credibility. The policy oriented concept of power tells who gets what, how, 
where, and when (Nye 2011, 7). How is power that is gained from 
accumulating soft power established and wielded in practice? 
The first point to consider is that “information creates power, and 
today a much larger part of the world’s population has access to that 
power” (Ibid., 103). It is about creating relationships and establishing the 
environmental (political and information flows) conditions between a state 
and foreign publics to influence the relational power between these groups. 
Three aspects to relational power exist: commanding change, controlling 
agenda, and establishing preferences (Ibid., 11). With the current state of 
information technologies, it is difficult to control an agenda completely; 
however, it is possible to initiate or influence.   
Soft power is openly sought and many countries are locked in a global 
competition for it. Some paradoxes emerge, such as the presence of public 
diplomacy and an absence of soft power and vice versa. For instance, Cull 
points out that North Korea has public diplomacy, but an absence of soft 
power, whereas Ireland has soft power, but minimal public diplomacy 
(2009, 15). Too much focus on the quest for soft power may ultimately 
prove counter-productive for an actor, as it can be viewed with suspicion 
by publics. These examples serve to illustrate a point made by Fan: “The 
relevance and ultimate effectiveness of soft power depends on the 
perception and response of its target audience” (2008, 156).  
                                                 
14 Nye 2004, 100; Fan 2008, 152. 
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There has been a great deal of discussion in Russia concerning soft 
power and public diplomacy, how these concepts currently relate, and how 
to further develop the potential. One feature of the debates has been to 
look at the United States and see if there is anything that can be learned 
and applied to Russia. This not only includes the theoretical and 
conceptual levels, but also the creation of institutions (such as the idea to 
create a Russian equivalent of the US Information Agency).15 There are 
others who advocate that Russia should develop its own soft power 
concept (application techniques, development strategies, priorities and 
objectives).16 Both of these sides see an urgent need to develop a viable soft 
power concept; otherwise Russia’s international position and potential will 
be eroded.  
A seeming consensus does exist on the need for Russia to engage in 
soft power through effective global communications. This includes 
communicating what is termed as “objective information” about Russia. 
The perceived reward is that Russia will be more successful in attaining its 
stated foreign policy objectives and in protecting its interests. The first step 
is to possess a resource of soft power (Pchel'nikov 2012).  
In July 2012, President Putin defined soft power as being “all about 
promoting one’s interests and policies through persuasion and creating a 
positive perception of one’s country, based not just on its material 
achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage” (2012). This is 
in line with an earlier observation made by Georgy Filimonov from the 
People’s Friendship University (Moscow). He drew strong connections 
between the accumulation of soft power and an effective and a functional 
system of public diplomacy. 
 
I believe it is quite legitimate to treat the concept of 
public diplomacy as a system of strategic views aimed at 
forming a positive image of a country abroad through the 
implementation of multi-level information and advocacy 
policy. The main directions of this policy are foreign 
cultural policy, cultural diplomacy, information and 
ideological promotion, educational exchange 
programmes, the involvement of a wide range of non-
governmental organisations and other civic institutions, 
the corporate sector … etc. Moreover, in contrast to 
traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy is addressed 
directly to the public. Therein lies its strength and 
effectiveness (Filimonov 2010). 
 
                                                 
15 Koshkin 2013. 
16 Zlobin 2013.  
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Efforts to develop Russia’s public diplomacy and potential ability to 
accumulate soft power, as described above, rely on the use of mass 
communication with foreign audiences in order to explain official policy. 
This comes against a backdrop in which Russia considers itself at a 
disadvantage on the international stage, owing to its poor image and 
reputation, which has been the result of “lack of understanding” and “bad” 
(non-objective) information in the global information space. There have 
been an increasing number of institutions that communicate and form 
relationships with an increasing number of people in foreign publics. Yet 
the image of Russia has not improved. This has led some to state that 
Russia is losing its soft power quest. An underlying reason given is that 
this does not concern Russia’s cultural or intellectual heritage and 
reputation, but more precisely the lack of popularity of its pursued policies 
(Dolinskii 2013). 
Fеdor Luk'ianov, еditor in chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, 
notes that Russia’s understanding differs “radically” from the Western 
view. He characterises Russian soft power as being “too soft.” There are 
three identified goals in its foreign policy. The first is “to promote Russian 
culture, the Russian language and the Russian education system as 
attractive and competitive.” The second goal is “to counter foreign media’s 
negative depiction of the country’s policies and the Russian way of life.” 
Third is to “create a group of Russia’s friends around the world.” Luk'ianov 
characterises this situation as an attempt to revive reasonably effective 
Soviet-era practices. However, the Soviet Union as a generous patron to 
those countries that are aligned with it, and the current Russia that places 
profit first, are incompatible (2013a). There is certainly disconnect between 
the ideologically driven soft power of the Soviet Union and the more 
pragmatic approach of contemporary Russia. The question is whether 
those messages and values from the twentieth century are still attractive in 
the twenty-first century. 
Although power is greatly sought by many countries around the world, 
it is hard to observe and accurately measure. Power is likewise extremely 
difficult to measure and quantify (Nye 2011, 3). It is an intangible asset, so 
it cannot be directly seen or touched, but it can exert an effect. It is much 
easier to measure activity than effect, which makes the temptation greater 
to demonstrate progress by showing what concrete activities have been 
carried out rather than by measuring what preferences or opinions have 
been influenced. In this light, opinion polls are an imperfect, yet essential 
measure of soft power resources. At least they provide a good first 
approximation (Nye 2004, 18). The BBC’s annual Country Ratings Poll is 
an example of one such poll that can provide a yardstick.  
 
2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
Russia has attempted to balance the political character of its state and 
society with its history, which has resulted in a debate about its identity 
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and foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian 
Federation differs greatly from any of its predecessors in terms of its 
political system, state borders, and geopolitical surroundings in its 
immediate neighbourhood. In June 2000, President Putin approved the 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept. A significant point of this document was 
that no matter how deep the internal changes a country makes, its foreign 
policy never starts from a clean slate. It is influenced by and bears a 
measure of continuity with the geopolitics, history, and culture of the 
country concerned (Ivanov 2001, 7). To some extent at least, a country can 
be trapped by their past.  
According to Ivanov, the aforementioned debate reached the 
conclusion that Russia’s foreign policy should be based upon the drivers of 
national interests and not by political ideology. He concluded that 
“Russian diplomacy has always succeeded when guided by realistic, 
pragmatic considerations and failed when dominated by imperial ideology 
and messianic ambitions” (Ibid., 8). This seems to signal a departure from 
the Soviet past, in which ideology played the central role, which was 
(according to Ivanov) replaced by more realistic and pragmatic approaches.  
The latest foreign policy concept replaces the earlier version from 
2008. On May 7, 2012, a presidential decree was issued that set out the 
terms and conditions for the new foreign policy concept. In mid-February 
2013, President Putin unveiled the new concept to members of the 
Security Council at a meeting in the Kremlin. During his address to 
members of the Security Council, Putin remarked: 
 
Russia will continue to pursue an active and 
constructive line in international affairs. Its weight and 
influence in the world will increase. […] The basic 
principles of Russian foreign policy remain the same. […] 
That means, above all, openness, predictability, 
pragmatism, and the pursuit of national interests without 
any confrontations in accordance with the role of the 
United Nations and the rule of international law. […] The 
concept focuses on modern foreign policy tools, including 
economic diplomacy, elements of so-called soft power, 
and careful integration into the global informational 
space (Makarychev and Latukhina 2013). 
 
There are a number of points that emerge from Putin’s address: the 
desire for Russia to be more active on the world stage, and to be more 
engaged in the global information space, and the active pursuit and 
accumulation of soft power to peacefully pursue Russia’s national interests 
within the existing international institutional and legal framework. He 
emphasizes that this needs to be done in a transparent and predictable 
manner. This seems to be an attempt to align Russia’s foreign policy with 
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an apparent narrative that emphasizes the country as a constructive force 
in international affairs. 
The 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
(hereafter “the Concept”) states the priorities, goals, and objectives. This 
new concept was precipitated by changing events and dynamics in the 
international arena.17 After listing what are seen as various actual and 
emerging global problems, the document then sets out to describe Russia’s 
priorities and role in addressing those problems. The highlighted problems 
are illustrated under various rubrics: Emergence of a New World Order, 
Rule of Law in International Relations, Strengthening International 
Security, International Cooperation in the Sphere of Economy and 
Environment, International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, 
and Information Support for Foreign Policy Activities. Point 103 of the 
Concept even mentions the possibility of a public-private partnership in 
helping to realise the stated goals and objectives. If these goals and 
objectives are to be realised, then Russia requires a good reputation and 
brand to be credible and effective. This is likely to be a long-term project 
given the current state of perception and the international image of Russia.  
 
Russian Nation Branding in the Global Arena  
According to Anholt, the branding of a nation is an essential part of 
modern statecraft: “A nation’s brand image is its most valuable asset: it is 
national identity made robust, tangible and communicable, and – at its 
best – made useful.”18 The image and branding of a country form the very 
centre and distinguishing features of a “national product” for public 
relations to do its work. Fan describes the link between soft power and 
nation branding: “Nation branding can be an important tool in the 
development of a nation’s soft power. […] Branding a nation is much more 
than just finding a catchy slogan or window-dressing but requires the 
study of a nation’s soft power sources in order to exploit them effectively to 
promote the national image” (Fan 2008, 155). 
Currently, Russia is somewhat locked between the past images and 
the current ones. The negative brands of the Soviet past prove to be very 
sticky images, associations, and stereotypes to shake before any tangible 
progress in rehabilitating the national brand can be made. Such well-
known brands and products as Pravda, the Bolshoi Ballet, Sputnik, 
Kalashnikov, Faberge and vodka tend to reinforce the symbols of culture 
                                                 
17 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” Unofficial Translation. Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (official site). February 18, 2013. Accessed August 
20, 2013. 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168
189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument 
18 Anholt, S. “What is a Nation Brand?” Superbrands. No date given. Accessed August 23, 
2013. http://www.superbrands.com/turkeysb/trcopy/files/Anholt_3939.pdf 
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and aggression. Julia Stonogina (Vice-President, International Association 
of Business Communications, Russia) explains the role of and differences 
in symbols and brands:  
 
Symbols and brands belong to different economic 
systems and different human consciousness. For 
instance, we might think the distance between symbols 
and brands is just about the same length as it is between 
propaganda and marketing. Symbols talk to us about 
politics, brands about economy. 
 
Symbols do not need to compete for the people’s 
emotional appreciation but brands do. Russia’s symbols 
belong to the time of the industrial economy, controlled 
market and totalitarian society. Russian brands should 
demonstrate the country’s economic transformation, 
post-industrial thinking and a new type of 
communication with the world.19 
 
Russia’s current international communications are aimed at 
influencing a more positive global perception of Russian symbols. The 
image of the Soviet menace has reduced somewhat, although there is still 
a lot of association with the Russian threat in the aftermath of the various 
gas wars and the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. This is reinforced by the 
continued use of Cold War and aggression associations and symbols in the 
Western media, in particular comparisons with specific past policy and 
events, such as the 2008 Georgian-Russian War, the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution, and the 1968 Prague Spring. Brand associations remain 
negative, for example with Aeroflot and the presumed poor standard 
service and safety of Russian air transportation. Russia’s reliance on oil is 
associated with companies such as Gazprom and the various gas wars. 
There is a need to rehabilitate the brand image, which is difficult to 
achieve when Russian brands are not as common in international 
consumer markets.  
There have been attempts to influence a more positive perception, 
such as membership in organisations such as BRICS and the WTO, which 
work toward Russia’s gradual integration into the global economy. 
However, this is offset by perceptions of rampant corruption and a hostile 
business environment for foreign investors. In a meeting with Russian 
Foreign Ministry officials in February 2013, Putin reminded them of their 
duty, priorities, and what lies ahead. 
                                                 
19 Stonogina, J. “Russia: Between Symbol and Brand.” Horasis. No date given. Accessed 
August 23, 2013. 
http://www.horasis.org/russia%20between%20symbol%20and%20brand.php 
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Obviously classic diplomacy is, if not particularly out 
of date, then seriously transformed. You and your 
colleagues have to deal with the economy, developing 
business relations, supporting various economic projects 
and opening new promising markets. […] The correct use 
of soft force mechanisms is a priority, such as a stronger 
position for the Russian language, promotion of Russia’s 
positive image abroad and the ability of an organic 
integration into global information flows. […] Bearing in 
mind the successful hosting of the APEC Vladivostok 
summit, it is necessary to organise the events of the G20, 
the G8, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation with equal attention (Putin 2013). 
 
These different components make up the assets that could be 
exploited to generate soft power through projecting a positive brand of 
Russia. Several different cultural and political events have been held, 
many of which fall within the range of what can be regarded as symbols, 
rather than brands. However, views about Russia are very diverse, from 
more positive to more negative. In 2012 the Anholt GfK Roper Nation 
Brands IndexSM ranked Russia in 41st place (out of 50 places). This is the 
sum of the perceptions, which ranged from 6th place for sporting 
achievements down to 42nd place (equal) for the government’s contribution 
to international peace and security, protecting the environment, and for 
expecting a warm reception when visiting the country. There is variation 
according to respondent countries as well. Turkish respondents ranked 
Russia in 13th place and Poles ranked it in 49th place (Anholt 2013). This 
demonstrates that even one country can possess a very diverse and 
polarised set of opinions and perceptions, which makes the task of 
branding such an entity very difficult, although it does present different 
avenues to pursue.  
Anholt offered Russia some advice on the issue of branding and soft 
power. In this regard, he ranked Russia as facing the same tests and trials as 
other countries. “So Russia’s task over the next decades is identical to the 
task facing most other countries. It doesn’t need to find ways of making 
people around the world feel in awe of Russia, impressed by Russia, or even 
envious of Russia: quite simply, it needs to find ways of making people feel 
glad that Russia exists” (Anholt 2013). Perhaps this is what the 2013 Concept 
is beginning to address. Certainly, bringing the world from the brink of war in 
Syria was a diplomatic coup by Russia at the perceived expense of the United 
States. However, this needs to be demonstrated as a long-term trend and not 
an isolated incident, which can take a long period of time to prove and 
ultimately reshape perceptions of Russia.  
President Putin recently addressed the Valdai Discussion Club and 
reinforced the image of Russia as a force for good in international relations 
Gregory Simons. Nation Branding and Russian Foreign Policy  
 
218 
from the point of historical continuity. Showcasing the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815 and the Yalta Conference in 1945 as success stories, and the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as a failure, the message was that Russia’s 
support and involvement led to a more stable international environment. 
In other words, “the world is not complete without Russia.” Luk'ianov 
added that “in order to continue to be an active player capable of offering 
creative approaches in foreign policy, Russia needs to foster an 
environment that promotes intellectual, social and, broadly speaking, 
human potential.” He added that “intellectual and technological 
competition is becoming the main proving ground on the way to success 
and influence.” The conclusion was that “people are now the main object of 
competition in the battle for minds, not only in the figurative sense of 
duelling images of soft power, but the literal sense of taking care of people 
who are creating innovative products, putting them to work, and providing 
opportunities for self-realisation” (Luk'ianov 2013b). The emphasis here is 
placed on the development and utilisation of human and intellectual 
capital, which gives a competitive edge in soft power. Certainly, the citizens 
of a nation, how they see themselves, and how others perceive them, are 
key components of nation branding.  
Indirect experience is one matter, as it can be difficult to change 
opinions and perceptions. Direct experience of a people and its culture can 
be a more effective means of challenging stereotypes and images, especially 
if the experience is positive and challenges the negative image. Tourism is 
one of the spheres that a country can effectively brand, and many do just 
that. In Russia, tourism is considered to be one of the younger industries. 
In 2011 tourism accounted for 2.5 percent of the national GDP. 
Information from the United Nations World Tourism Organisation ranked 
Russia 59th, which implies it is an attractive global tourist destination.20 
However, for various reasons, Russian tourism has not received priority for 
financing, development, or marketing. This means that international 
standards in transportation, hospitality, services, and entertainment for 
tourists lag behind (Delvaux 2011). The tourist industry is a good means of 
introducing foreign publics (firsthand) to different cultural and heritage 
aspects of soft power and to project its civic and cultural capital. In some 
regards, this seems to be an opportunity lost.  
However, there are some promising islands of progress in branding 
parts of Russia. St. Petersburg is seemingly serving as a blueprint for other 
Russian localities. It is historically and contemporarily close to Europe in 
terms of geography and symbolism. Under Peter the Great, it served as a 
window to Europe. City authorities have set a clear number of goals, 
including “developing the range of excursions, business facilities, cruises, 
                                                 
20 In 2012 Russia moved to 7th place in the top 10 tourist destinations, some 26 million 
tourists visited the country. For more please see information on page six of the following 
document 
http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_highlights13_en_hr_0.pdf 
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sanatoriums and resorts in the region.” St. Petersburg is considered ahead 
of Moscow in catering for tourists. Other localities in Russia that would be 
good objects for branding are the Republic of Tatarstan, where East meets 
West (blending Islam and Orthodoxy). Veliky Ustyug competes with the 
Nordic countries as the home of Santa Claus (Ded Moroz).21 It is possible 
to add that the Golden Ring (a cluster of ancient Russian towns and cities 
around Moscow) could be developed to showcase and sell experiences of 
Russian heritage and culture.  
Large-scale international events hosted by a country can also present 
an opportunity to showcase the country on the world stage while being the 
centre of media attention. That said, there are some risks involved should 
things go “wrong.” Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in the 
Black Sea city of Sochi, a resort area branded as the Russian Riviera. This 
gives the locality its context and location within the different positions that 
can be occupied by cities. The only previous time that the Olympic Games 
were hosted in Russia occurred with the Moscow Games in 1980, which 
was boycotted by many countries in response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Therefore, this occasion was seen as having “created an 
unparalleled, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the country to boost its 
international reputation and reshape the “red bear” image” (Ostapenko 
2010, 60). The hosting of the Games in Sochi could potentially put a focus 
and priority on the development of tourism infrastructure and capacity in 
Russia.  
Sochi 2014 focused many Russians on what they wanted to see come 
out of the event. Polls conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research 
Centre showed that 52 percent of respondents wanted increased prestige 
for the country, 48 percent a boost in athletic activities, and 26 percent an 
increase in national self-consciousness. However, the dimension of 
international communication was rather low-key, such as the unveiling of 
the Sochi Games logo (a snowflake that is captured on the Russian state 
flag). The global outreach was too subtle (Ibid.). The Games had their own 
website (www.sochi2014.com), with information available in Russian, 
French, and English. Logos of the international Olympic brand were 
featured on the site, but the Sochi brand was harder to find. A lot more 
could have been done to market and communicate the Russia and Sochi 
brand to the global publics in advance of the Games. During Putin’s 
speech to Russian diplomats, he mentioned the importance of successfully 
hosting international key events. Sochi 2014 had much greater potential 
than those events that he mentioned.  
One final case to be introduced here, as an example of an attempt at 
creating a tangible brand (although not at the national level), is that of 
Skolkovo (http://community.sk.ru). This was an attempt to tangibly brand 
the policy of modernisation under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. 
                                                 
21 Delvaux 2011.  
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There was also the intention to attract foreign investment and partnership. 
The project was dubbed the “Russian Silicon Valley.” This innovation hub 
will take much time to be realised, and will focus on five research areas: 
energy, information technologies, communication, biomedical research, 
and nuclear technologies.22 However, various circumstances have bogged 
down the process, including cases of embezzlement.23 There has been 
tentative optimism expressed by some as to the progress of this project. 
There is also a clear message about a break from the Soviet past. “Unlike 
secret Soviet-era science cities, or naukogrady, where research 
and production facilities were hidden from the outside world, Skolkovo 
innovation city is on display for everyone to see” (Moukine 2013). This 
seems to be along the lines of the message that Stonogina argued needed 
to be demonstrated to show the transformation of the economy and the 
way of thinking.  
 
Conclusion 
Olins warns that nation branding is a very complex and slow 
enterprise. It can take many years to implement, with results slow to come 
in and are difficult to measure. This can contradict expectations in the 
political world, which may demand quick and readily measureable results 
(Olins 2005, 178). Russia faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it has a new 
and ambitious set of goals and objectives in the 2013 Concept. On the 
other hand, its brand and reputation more often than not contain sticky 
negative stereotypes and prejudices, regardless of the argumentations 
concerning their accuracy. This does not preclude some kind of change.  
Anholt has stated that a country’s total brand is related to the sum of 
perceptions across tourism, exports, people, governance, culture, heritage, 
investment, and immigration. Added to this is Fan’s contention that nation 
branding needs to “embrace political, cultural, business and sport 
activities,” which contribute to the formation of the political, economic, and 
cultural brand. The promotion of Russia (including nation branding) is 
directed at accumulating soft power in order to more effectively sell 
government policy and interests. The main message or idea being conveyed 
is that Russia plays a positive role in the world. In terms of positioning, 
Russia tends to position itself as an alternative/competitor to the West 
(understood as being the block of countries that are lead/influenced by the 
United States). The 2013 Concept tends to reinforce this notion.  
                                                 
22 “Russia’s ‘Silicon Valley’ Construction to Cost Up to $3.9 bln.” 2010. RIA Novosti, 
December 25. Accessed September 24, 2013. 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101225/161931618.html 
23 “Skolkovo Officials Suspected of Embezzling $800, 000.” 2013. RIA Novosti, February 12. 
Accessed September 2013. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130212/179420351/Skolkovo-
Officials-Suspected-of-Embezzling-800000.html 
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Putin has emphasized the need to use “spiritual and cultural heritage” 
in addition to material achievements to help shape the Russian brand. 
This means that communications should not only convey various scientific 
and sporting successes, but also softer aspects that are less political in 
nature. Attempted influence is being placed upon a much more pragmatic 
idea based upon interests and policies, as opposed to the Soviet model, 
which was based upon political ideology.  
This article provided a limited number of empirical examples of 
branding in different spheres (politics, culture, business, and sport). The 
Sochi 2014 Games possessed great potential in branding Russia, the host 
of this international event, given the potentially positive sets of emotions 
that could assist in reshaping perceptions and stereotypes. This potential 
has not been adequately accomplished. It was a high profile event, but 
with a rather low profile global media coverage. Skolkovo is an attempt to 
attract international partners to create a Russian Silicon Valley, and is 
based upon a set of logical and pragmatic notions. If successful, this could 
also be used to create a brand that symbolises the transformation of the 
economy and a way of thinking in the business/research sectors. Tourism 
is another field that has much potential, yet has not been tapped to its full 
potential to date. An influx of tourists could potentially allow for a more 
interactive and relational interaction with foreign publics, perhaps in some 
instances enabling emotional appreciation to develop under the “right” set 
of circumstances. This also provides a venue and occasion to showcase 
Russian culture, heritage, and spirituality.  
This ignores a very important factor that shapes national identity: the 
reference point of construed image and actual image. It also affects how 
the current projected image and desired future image can be approached. 
That factor is the country’s population. During the September 2013 Valdai 
Forum, President Putin emphasized the role to be played by human capital 
in Russia’s relations with the outside world, and the problems and 
contradictions within this segment of soft power assets.  
 
Educated, creative, physically and spiritually healthy 
people, rather than natural resources or nuclear 
weapons, will be Russia’s main strength in this and 
coming centuries. […] Unfortunately, little value was 
placed in an individual life in much of Russian history. 
All too often, people were treated as just a means to an 
end rather than the objective and the mission of 
development. We no longer have the right or even the 
ability to throw millions of people into the furnace of 
development. We need to take care of everybody (Cited in 
Luk'ianov 2013b). 
 
The cultural, economic, and political brands have been subject to 
analysis and review. However, the “people brand,” exemplified by external 
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and internal stereotypes and prejudices, has been a relatively neglected 
factor until recently. This may be about to change after Putin’s speech at 
the Valdai Discussion Club. If relationships are to be formed and 
innovations created, it will require spiritual (in terms of character) and 
intellectual capital that only people can potentially provide. They are the 
ones who can make or break the brand.  
There have been a number of different barriers that have been noted by 
political, academic, and policy circles in achieving a “good” brand for Russia. 
This includes global media, which has often been criticised for using dated 
stereotypes and images. This has been one of the motivating factors for 
Russia to boost its ability to communicate to international publics. 
Admissions have also been made that Russia’s current image is influenced 
by its past in terms of geopolitics, history, and culture. This means that 
there is no clean slate, but rather a number of existing images that inhibit 
the projection of the current desired image. This has been noted with regard 
to the associations of culture and aggression. A final point is that there is a 
tendency for top-down policy implementation in Russia. To some extent, this 
contradicts what Putin said about the importance of people (at Valdai) 
compared with his speech about hosting large-scale international events to 
an audience of diplomats. Nation branding requires a bottom-up approach 
to succeed, as ordinary citizens convey as much, if not more, about a 
country than hosted international events.  
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